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It has been a while aback I wrote the aboriginal two articles in my alternation on Docker security. This commodity will accord an amend on what has been added to Docker aback again and awning new functionality that is activity through the absorb action with upstream Docker.

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In the antecedent articles, I covered alembic breach based on Linux Capabilities.

Linux Capabilities acquiesce you to breach afar the adeptness of basis into abate groups of privileges. Currently docker containers by absence alone get the afterward capabilities.

CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FSETID, FOWNER, MKNOD, NET_RAW, SETGID, SETUID, SETFCAP, SETPCAP, NET_BIND_SERVICE, SYS_CHROOT, KILL, AUDIT_WRITE

In some cases you adeptness appetite to acclimatize this list, for example, if you were architecture a alembic that would run ntpd or crony, which needs to be able to adapt the host arrangement time. The alembic would not run because it requires CAP_SYS_TIME. In earlier versions of docker, the alembic would accept to run in –privileged mode, which turns off all security.

In docker-1.3 –cap-add, –cap-drop were added. Now in adjustment to run an ntpd container, you could aloof run:

docker run -d –cap-add SYS_TIME ntpd

Which would alone add the SYS_TIME adequacy to your container.

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Another archetype would be if you alembic did not change the UID/GID of any processes, you could bead these capabilities from your container, authoritative it added secure.

docker run –cap-drop SETUID –cap-drop SETGID –cap-drop FOWNER fedora /bin/sh

# pscap | grep 29125417 2912 basis sh chown, dac_override, fsetid, kill, setpcap, net_bind_service, net_raw, sys_chroot, mknod, audit_write, setfcap

Or you could bead all capabilities and add one back.

docker run –cap-drop ALL –cap-add SYS_TIME ntpd /bin/sh

# pscap | grep 23825417 2382 basis sh sys_time

Similar to capabilities, we accept added the adeptness to acclimatize the SELinux labels on the fly.

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If you accept apparent the SELinux appearance book, you apperceive that we can abstracted processes by types and by MCS/MLS Levels. We use types to assure the host from the container. But we could additionally acclimatize the types to ascendancy what arrangement ports are accustomed into and out of the container. Currently, we run all containers with the svirt_net_lxc_t. This blazon is accustomed to accept on all arrangement ports and accustomed to affix out on all arrangement ports. We could bind the aegis on the alembic by adjusting the SELinux blazon label.

With approved SELinux and Apache httpd, we by absence alone acquiesce the apache action to accept on the Apache ports (http_port_t).

# sudo sepolicy arrangement -t http_port_t

http_port_t: tcp: 80,81,443,488,8008,8009,8443,9000

We additionally block all approachable anchorage connections. This helps us lock bottomward the Apache process, and alike if a hacker were to capsize an appliance with a aegis vulnerability like ShellShock, we could stop the appliance from acceptable a spam bot, or acceptance the action to admit attacks on added systems. It is like Hotel California, “You can analysis in any time you want, but you can never leave.”

With containers, however, if you were active an Apache server appliance aural a container, and the appliance were subverted, the Apache action would be able to affix to any arrangement ports and become a spam bot, or advance added hosts/containers via the network.

It is adequately simple to actualize a new action blazon to run with your containers application SELinux. First, you could actualize an SELinux TE (Type Enforcement) file.

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# cat > docker_apache.te << _EOF

policy_module(docker_apache,1.0)

# This arrangement interface creates the docker_apache_t blazon as a# blazon which can be run as a docker container. The template# gives the domain the atomic privileges appropriate to run.virt_sandbox_domain_template(docker_apache)

# I apperceive that the apache apparition aural the alembic will require# some capabilities to run. Luckily I already accept action for# Apache and I can query SELinux for the capabilities.# sesearch -AC -s httpd_t -c capabilityallow docker_apache_t self: adequacy { chown dac_override annihilate setgid setuid net_bind_service sys_chroot sys_nice sys_tty_config } ;

# These are the rules appropriate to acquiesce the alembic to listen# to Apache ports on the network.

allow docker_apache_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;allow docker_apache_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(docker_apache_t)corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(docker_apache_t)corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes(docker_apache_t)corenet_udp_bind_http_port(docker_apache_t)

# Apache needs to dness names adjoin a DNS serversysnet_dns_name_resolve(docker_apache_t)

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# Acquiescent domains acquiesce processes to not be blocked by SELinux# While developing and testing your action you apparently appetite to# run the alembic in acquiescent mode.# You appetite to aish this rule, back you are assured in the# policy.permissive docker_apache_t;_EOF

# accomplish -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile docker_apache.pp# semodule -i docker_apache.pp

Now run the alembic with the new type:

# docker run -d –security-opt type:docker_apache_t httpd

Now this alembic would run with abundant tighter SELinux aegis again a accustomed container. Note you apparently would charge to watch the analysis logs to see if your app needs added SELinux acquiesce rules.

You could add these rules by application the audit2allow command and appending the rules assimilate the absolute .te file, recompile and install.

# grep docker_apache_t /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow >> docker_apache.te# accomplish -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile docker_apache.pp# semodule -i docker_apache.pp

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Currently, we use MCS Breach to accomplish abiding out containers are not accustomed to baffle or collaborate with added container, except if it is through the network. Certain government systems crave a altered blazon of action MLS (Multi Akin Security). With MLS, you characterization the processes based on the akin of the abstracts they will be seeing. MLS says that if your alembic is activity to be processing TopSecret abstracts again it should run at TopSecret. We accept added options to docker to acquiesce admins to bureaucracy the containers to run at a specific level, which should amuse the needs of MLS systems.

docker run -d –security-opt label:level:TopSecret –security-opt label:type:docker_apache_t httpd

This would accredit to docker alembic to run with both the alternating type, and level, and would anticipate the alembic from application abstracts that was not at the aforementioned label. This has not gone through accreditation at this point, but we would be accommodating to advice third parties body solutions for the MLS users.

In the added aegis talks, I accept discussed how namespaces could be advised a aegis mechanism, aback the alone the adeptness of a action from seeing added processes on the arrangement (PID namespace). The arrangement namespace can annihilate the adeptness to see added networks from your namespace. IPC (inter-process communications) namespace has the adeptness to block containers from application added alembic IPC.

Docker now has the adeptness to alleviate these restrictions. You can allotment the hosts namespaces with the container:

–pid=host Lets the alembic allotment the hosts pid namespace–net=host Lets the alembic allotment the hosts net namespace–ipc=host Lets the alembic allotment the hosts ipc namespace

Note that aback administration the PID or IPC namespaces with the host requires us to attenuate SELinux breach in adjustment from them to work.

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docker run -ti –pid=host –net=host –ipc=host rhel7 /bin/sh

You adeptness appetite to apprehend added advice on this in the article Super Privileged Containers.

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